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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
.John B. Yea te~.
Plaintiff and Appellaut
Archie L. Budge,
Defendant
and

Brief of Appellants
Appeals No's 7851-7852

Archie L. Budge,
Plaintiff
vs.
:\Irs. John B. Yeates,
Defendant and Appellant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(Reference to pages of reporter's transcript)
On September 11, 1951 Mrs. Yeates was driving her
husband's car from Nibley to the Logan Cache Library
in Logan. Nibley is about 5 miles south of Logan. Fnder
the State Highway System, Utah highway No. 1 runs
from the Idaho Line north of Logan, through Logan,
south to Wellsville and then south through the State.
Utah highway No. 101. runs from Logan south through
Nibley. Thus immediately south of Logan the same
roadway is both No. 1 and No. 101. Approximately onehalf mile south of Logan City limits, these highways
divide and form an aln1ost perfect "Y".
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\Vhen Mrs. Yeates left the library she drove south

on Highways 101 and 1 and as she approched the "Y"
at about ;) :4:> P.

~I., ~I r.

Budge was approaching the

'' Y'' from the south and traveling north into Logan
and in a 35 mile zone ( tr. 62) at 35 mph. :Mrs. Yeates
wa:-: going about 25. (tr. 7)
Where the two numbered highways are consolidated
they have four lanes. After they divide, each is a two
lane highway.
The two cars met at the "Y". :Mrs. Yeates attemped to keep in her lane and stay on No. 101 by turning
her car to the left of center of the intersection, and to
the left of :Mr. Budge, (tr. 9) to avoid a head on collision.
But, Mr. Budge tried to turn to his right of the center
of the intersection, and to pass in front of Mrs. Yeates,
who seeing there was about to be a wreck applied her
brakes in an attempt to avoid the accid~nt. (tr. 9). She
waD practically stopped when str~k. She had been
following an ambulance traveling in front of her.
~lrs.

Yeates signaled that she was going to turn
left in order to get into the left lane of the southbound
traffic ( tr. 16) and Budge was approaching and about
on the intersection ( tr. 18) at about 35 mph. He had
clear vision on the road and traffic to the Citr LimitD
of Logan, Y-4 to Y2 mile. He saw the ambulance, but did
not know whether it would take highway No. 1, or 101
(tr. 63), thought it had the right of way, but he did not
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~low down for )Irs. Yeates because he thought he had
the right of way over her ( tr. 72).
(There wa~ son1e confusion in the Court's n1ind about
the pleadings ( tr. 73, 74), and the Lower Court reversed
it's decision of non-suit when the fact wa::-; called to
his mind that ~~ rs. Yeate~ wa~ not acting as agent
for :Jlr. Yeates and before this was cleared up, the
Court stated: •' The 1notion for a nonsuit -against l\1 r.
Yeates-is granted a~ to the cmnplaint and the counterclainl. \Ye '11 1nake then1 (Budge) go forward and see
whether or not the defendant can extricate himself from
the legal dilennna he finds himself in, and whether you
can clear hin1 of the imputation of proximate causation
on his part so as to entitled him to a verdict". (tr. 62).)
Budge could have let :Mrs. Yeates pass in front of
him or he could have passd to her left ( tr. 73), but he
tried to pass in front of her and in so doing struck her
broadside on the East side of the highway.
:\Jr. Yeates brought the suit against Budge for damage to his car, and Budge brought a suit against Mrs.
Yeates for the damage to his car. The Court consolidated the trials, and all parties have stipulated that
the two appeals might be consolidated.
STATE11EN'r OF POINTS
That the court erred as follows :
Point 1. (No. 7851) By making it's judgment in
favor of defendant and against the plaintiff.
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Point 2. (No. 7851) By making it's finding Xo. 4
to the effect that the sole proxirnate cause of
the accident was the negligence of Bertha Yeates in making a left hand turn at the intersection in front of defendant's vehicle and when
defendant's vehicle was in such close proximity
to Yeates' vehicle as to constitute an irnrnediate
hazard, and in rnaking it's conclusion of law
No.1.

Point 3. (7851) In failing to make a finding that
defendant's negligence was a concurrent and
contributing proxirnate cause of the accident,
and failing to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, and assessing darnages accordingly.
Point 1. (No. 7852) By making and entering it's
judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in any surn whatsoever.
Point 2. (No. 7852) By making it's findings Nos.
3 & 5 in that the Court found that plaintiff's
injuries were caused h:~ the negligence of defendant, which was the sole proximate cause
of the accident.
Point 3. (No. 7852) By failing to find that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which
proximately caused his darnages barring his
recovery, and by making it's conclusion of law,
No.2.
ARGUMENT.
The argument herein contained will consider all of
the Statement of Points together bcause there is only
one question-i. e. was Mr. Budge guilty of negligence
and was his negligence a contributing proximate causE·
of the wreck.
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~\11

through the case 1ny opponents went on the

theory that nry client

\Ya~

highway X o. 101. Thi~ i~ not
way Xo. 101 and wat' going
making no turnt' whatsoever
leaYing one highway to turn

1naking a left turn into
the fact. She wa~ on highto renmin on it. She was
in the sense that she wa;-:
into another.

The question of who entered the intersection first is
section is so vague that this question could not be
answered at the trial.
Pertinent statutes are as follows:
37-7-113 (a) UCA, 1943. "No person shall
drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater
than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having. regard to the actual and
potential hazards then existing .In every event
speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary
to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or
other conveyance on or entering the highway
in cmnpliance with legal requirements and the
duty of all persons to use due care.
57-7-113 (c) (as amended by the laws of 1951)
'' ':Phe driver of every vehicle shall, consistent
with the requirements of sub-division (a) of
this section, dr·ive at an appropriate reduced
speed when approaching and crossing an intersection. . . . . ''
57-7-130 (b) (as amended by the laws of 1949)
"At any intersection where traffic is permitted
to move in both directions on each roadway
left turn shall be made in that portion of the
right half of the roadway nearest the center
line thereof and hy passing to the right of such
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center line where it enters the intersection and
after entering the intersection the left turn shall
be made so as to leave the intersection to the
right of the center line of the roadway being
entered. Whenever practicable the left turn
shall be made in that portion of the intersection
to the left of the center of the intersection".

I will refer to the two cases by the names of the
plaintiff in each. In the Yeates case the Court made
the following finding:
"that the defendant (Budge) negligently operated his vehicle in driving the same too fast for
existing conditions, but that the sole proximate
cause of the accident w a s the negligence of
Bertha Yeates in making a left turn at the intersection in front of the defendant's vehicle and
when the defendant's vehicle was in such close
proximity to the YeateR vehicle as to constitute
an immediate hazard.''
While in the Budge case we find the following finding (No. 2 & 4).
''the defendant Mrs. John B. Yeates negligently
by failing to keep a proper lookout, by turning
left into the plaintiff's lane of traffic when the
automobile of the plaintiff was so close as to
be an immediate hazard, drove an automobile
into the auton1obile of the plaintiff. . . . . . (4)
That the plaintiff was negligent in driving hi~
automobile at an excessive rate of speed at the
said intersection''.
I am mindful of the n1ost recent case from this
Court which is not yet in the reports. Lynn W. Martin, plaintiff v. Paul H. Stevens, defendant. No. 7731.
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That ea~P does not control here because the Court
there specifically held that the plaintiff had the right
of way. In this case the Court said:
·~·

•'the negligence, or 1uanner of driving, of the
other driver was such that the driver appraising the situation "·a~ alerted to it or by using
due care would have been 80 alerted in time so
that by the exercise of ordinary precaution he
could have avoided the collision.''
In that case this Court extensively reviewed the Intersection cases, and cases involving negligence as a
matter of law. and it is not necessary to again cite
and quote from each case. In the present caE'e the
Court found Budge guilty of negligence in speeding
into the intersection. It was not for the negative question of failing to see son1ething he should have seen.
It must be kept in mind that courts constantly talk
of the "favored driver". In our case there is no such
driver. Budge had no reason to know or expect which
highway Mrs. Yeates would take (tr. 78), and Budge
testified:

Q. Now, Mr. Budge, \Vhen you came up the highway on the day of this accident, who do you
calculate or believe had the right of way~
A. 1Vell, there wasn't no reason to believe there
was anybody had the right of (way). I see the
ambulance come along the road and there was
a car imn1ediately ahead of me. I'd sa~· about
probably three hundred feet, and as I met the
ambulance just about opposite the Phillips 66
Service Station, about the pumps, and I proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ceeded on through the intersection, and I would
judge 1\frs. Yeate's car was about-oh, when I
1net the ambulance I guess about five or 600
feet down t hP road."
He see1ned to be confused and had no idea, (in his
mind) which highway Mrs. Yeates was going to take.
She was not passing any vehicles as she entered the
intersection, but was in her left lane, so that Budge
should have concluded that she would follow highway
101 to Nibley (tr. 46 & 47). But, he did nothing. He
kept up his speed, which the Court specifically found
was too fast. He did not even turn or apparently not
attempted a turn. (tr. 43 & 44) "A. His (Budges
skid marks) didn't have any angle. They came straight
up the road." (Note reporters map-last page of transcript.)
It appears to me that the question here is: Can a
person cross an intersection at an excessive speed for
conditions of the intersection, have wreck in the intersection, and still not be guilty of negligence which
substantially contributed to the accident~ Budge testified: (tr. 72) Q.

a

Q. Well, you said before you didn't know whether the ambulance was going to turn into 101 or
into highway 1, so you slowed down.
A. Well, the ambulances have the right of way on
all roads regardless of which (way) they're going
or where. You're supposed to give them the right
of way.
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Q. Oh, I see. You gave the ambulance the right
of way'?
..:\.. I wasn't in the intersection then. I slowed
down to nmke ~nue I wouldn't be in the intersection at the tilne the a1ubulance passed through
there.

Q. But, you didn't slow down for Mrs. Yeates f
A. rrhere was no signal or anything that she was
going to cross then.

Q. There was no signal by the mnbulance ~
A. The ambulance doesn't have to give one. He
can cross any road at any time without any
signal.
..:\.. I knew an ambulance or a doctor or anything
had the right of way.
Q. But you did believe the ambulance had the
right of way, over you, but you had it over Mrs.
Yeates~

A. I believe I had the right of way coming into
the intersection but :Mrs. Yeates hadn't indicated
she was going to cross the intersection, and I
could have yielded to her if I would have known''.
I conceed the proposition that the mere exceeding
of a speed limit does not always bar a recovery by
the one exceeding the li1nit. That is because the excess speed may not be a negligent operation of the
vehicle. But, where at an intersection the excess speed
is negligent, and places the car at the exact point of
impact, then it does bar arecovery. This point is well
stated in All American Bus Lines v. Saxon, (Okla.)
172 P. 2d 424 where the Court said:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''Possibly the bus driver could not he charged
with negligence because of any act committed
after being confronted with a sudden emergency,
placing his bus and his passengers in a position
of peril, but if he was negligent in operating~
the bus at an excessive rate of speed such a~
was instrumental in bringing about the emergency and creating the position of peril, the bus
driver was not excusable.''
The reason Budge could not turn to the left of the
center of the intersection as the statute requires him
to do, was because of his excessive speed, as found
by the Court; it was not because it was impractical
to do so. Instead, he deliberately tried to turn right
of the center and in front of :Mrs. Yeats. He might
avoid the consequences of a mistake in judgment in
an emergency, but not when his own negligence creates
the emergency. This is well stated in Allen v Schultz,
(Wash.) 181 P. 916:
'' The cause of his (driver) being placed in the
perilous situation and his acts in extricating himself therefrom are disclosed by his own testimony. Since the testimony shows conclusively
that he was guilty of negligence, there was no
question for the jury.''
The finding in our case was that Mrs. Yeates had
turned suddenly in such a manner as to cause an immediate hazard, and then the Court finds, in both
cases that Budge was guilty of negligence by excessive speed, and too fast for existing conditions. Had the
Court found Budge free from negligence, some reason
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I:'Xi~t

~ame a~

11
for the decision, but finding negligence

i~

the

finding that Rudge did not act with due caution

and diligence.
Turning to the evidence we find that .\lrs.
wa:' 190 feet

awa:~

Yeate~

fr01n Budge when he began to notice

her (tr. :-)1). ICing testified for Budge: "Q. Was there
any ob:'truction whatsoever on the highwa:· that would
create a hazard had he driven to her west~ A. No.''
And yet he struck ~Irs. Yeates while still tr~veling at
the rate of 20 1nph sliding his tires for 41 feet, and 1\frs.
Yeates had slid hers for 37 feet. (tr. 109).
Gambrel v. Duensing, (Cal.) 16 P. 2a284, is a case
where a 1notorist came up o n some horsemen from
their rear. A horse slipped and the motorist tried to
avoid responsibility by invoking the doctrine of sudden emergency.
''In other words, if one who fails to exercise
ordinary precautions when approaching or about
to pass an animal is suddely confronted with
additional peril by reason of the movement of
that animal, and injury results therefrom, responsibility is not lifted from the shoulders of
the one failing to exercise such reasonable precautions.''
This rule is probably better stated in the California case of Throwbridge v. Briggs, 35 P. 2d
426. ''This doctrine is not available to them, as
it is never available to relieve one from the
consequences of a vehicular collision unless he
is himself otherwise without negligence.''
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Apparently the lower Court went astray by the holding in the Cederloff case decided by this Court. ( tr. 115).
Cederloff v. Whited, 169 P. 2d 777. Here the defendant
was making a left turn (not at an intersection) directly
in the line of plaintiff's car.
The Court in that case held that even though plaintiff had kept a proper lookout he could not have done
other than he did. Furthermore, that case went on the
theory of a left hand turn into opposing traffic. There
is no question of a turn in this case. No finding "·a:-:
nmde in the Cederloff case of the plaintiff's negligence.
In fact the holding was that plaintiff was free from
negligence because he had no other course he could take,
regardless of what defendant had done. Apply that
reasoning to our case. The other course Budge could
have taken was to have driven in a cautious manner,
and if he had done so no accident could possibly have
happened.
I have tried to find a Utah case parallel to this
where there was a specific finding of negligence, which
negligence had placed a party in a position of peril,
or given rise to an emergency created by the party
trying to recover, but am unable to do so.
It should be kept in mind that in this case Budge
struck :Mrs. Yeates when she was practically stopped
(tr. 9), and that she could do nothing to avoid the
impact. When Budge belatedly realized there was go~
ing to be a crash he turned in the wrong direction ( tr.
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-!8). He should have given the situation at the inter;:;c·ction his attention a~ stated in the vVashington case
of Tacket v. l\Iilburn, 218 P. 2d 298:
(Appellant was following a car too closely) "His
duty was to give his attention to this situation.
When he belatedly returned his eyes to the car
ahead an emergency existed, but it was one of
his own making, and he cannot avail himself
of the emergency rule''.
Budge had no right to assume that 1\frs. Yeates
would take highway No. 1. He travelled the highway
five times a week, between Ogden and Logan (working
in Ogden-going in the mornings and returning at about
this time at evening) and knew all of the travel over
101 to Nibley, :Millville, Providence, Hyrun1, Paradise
and Avon, from Logan (tr. 49). One of the few places
left in Utah where travel is to the right of the center
of the intersection is around the Brigham Young Monument in Salt Lake City. The old buttons in the center of
the intersections have all been removed, and the law
changed accordingly, so that cars that come to an
intersection shall pass to the left of the center whenever practicable. It would be inconcievable to do otherwise at this intersection, and the only reason why this
was not done was because of the excessive speed of
Budge.
There are countless cases on the subject at hand,
and many of these have been collected in the Annotation in 77 ALR 582. However, unless a case almost
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exactly in point is found, they do not appear to
n1uch help by applying generalities.

bt!

A case exactly in point is found in the recent ca:;(l
of Graham v. Roderick, (Wash.) 202 P. 2d 253. 1,hh~
court said:
''Therefore, what appellant now asks is that we
hold that the preponderance of the evidence supports a ruling that the aqcident would have happened if, rather than traveling at some speed
in excess of 35 miles per hour, he had been
proceeding at the legal rate of 25 miles per hour.
We may agree that what appellant contends for
is a possibility, but under the evidence in the
record it is too remote a possibility, to allow us
to conclude that his excessive speed was not a
contributing proximate cause of the collision....
Since appellant, while traveling at a speed in
excess of 35 miles per. hour, observed r~spon
dent's car in time to slow down and swerve to
his left so as to deal only a glancing blow, although at the time he thought he could avoid
the impact entirely, it is more than probable,
in fact almost certa)in, that, if appellant had
been traveling at the legally prescribed rate, the
collision would have been averted.''
That case is very interesting because it involves a
driver making a '' U'' turn on an arterial highway. In
our case both highways were are arterial.

Respectfully submitted.
Geo. D. Preston,
.Attorney for appellants.
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